TIME FOR TQ
Training Small Unit Leaders

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Everything good *that happens seems to come from good
intelligence.*
General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., USA, 1970[1]

Tactical Questioning (TQ) in any military operation is an integral part of developing the intelligence picture and gaining situational awareness as to the immediate environment. The Counter Intelligence/Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) course instructors at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) have developed a program to train Marines in the techniques and procedures of TQ and have begun to deploy mobile training teams to begin implementation of the program. Training in TQ should be afforded to all combat arms Marines with the focus on small unit leaders. The impetus is on The Basic School (TBS) to implement training in TQ for all lieutenants by designating a primary instructor, training the instructor staff, and integrating the training into the existing period of instruction (POI).

Background

In war, one of the primary means of gathering information on the weather, enemy, and terrain in any area should be through HUMINT. In this sense, the <u>DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</u> broadly defines HUMINT as any "intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources."[2] In contrast, FM 2-0, <u>Intelligence</u>, narrowly defines

HUMINT as "the collection [of information] by a trained HUMINT Collector."[3] This narrow definition limits the possibilities when developing a plan to address collecting information. Leveraging all available assets to gather information should be the priority and using all available Marines is the way to do it.

The authors of Front-Line Intelligence state that if soldiers "*know what you want* [Commander's Critical Information Requirements(CCIR)], [they] will keep their eyes and ears open, and when they find out anything will *immediately* report it." (author's emphasis)[4] The impetus is on the commander and the unit intelligence officer (S-2) to ensure every Marine knows the information the command needs to accomplish the mission. In the current counterinsurgency fight, the Army's 10th Mountain Division has created the concept of Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) to not only build the unit's battlespace awareness, but also to build better informed decision makers. ES2 is focused on three critical areas: cultural awareness, language, and TQ.[5] The first two are valid concepts worth discussing, but the focus here is on TQ and how to train it in the Marine Corps.

Definition

Understanding of the term TQ, specifically its limitations, is crucial in devising any individual or unit training. TQ is defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as "Direct questioning by any DoD

personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain time sensitive tactical intelligence, at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent with applicable law." [6]

FM 2-0, Intelligence, goes further in describing TQ as "the expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value."[7] Additionally, FM 2-0 adds that leaders should incorporate guidance on TQ into the order for every mission and the S-2 and operations officer (S-3) should provide guidance for meeting the unit's information requirements through TQ.[8] Understanding of TQ thus requires training at all levels of command, not just the squad leader or platoon commander on a patrol. In order for a commander to develop the situation in his battlespace every Marine must know what information is critical to the commander.

Before discussing the training issues, it is important to clarify two key points. First, TQ is not interrogation. Interrogation is conducted only by qualified interrogators (MOS 0211 CI/HUMINT Specialist, 0210 Counterintelligence Warrant Officer and 0204 Human Source Intelligence Officer). Second, TQ is not source operations. Again source operations are conducted only by qualified CI/HUMINT Marines. The Marine Corps limits TQ to interviewing persons on a one-time basis in other than detainee scenarios.

Requirements

The new counterinsurgency publication, MCWP 3-33.5, states that only "properly trained Soldiers and Marines can conduct immediate tactical questioning of detainees or defectors."[9] The question then becomes what makes a Marine qualified to conduct TQ. The Marine Corps answer is completion of the three day course developed by the CI/HUMINT instructors at NMITC. The focus of this training should be on small unit leaders, those leading patrols, convoys, searches, etc. In the Marine Corps, any training directed at the small unit leader level should start at TBS. The problem is how to train 12 of the 15 individual training standards put forth by NMITC to companies in excess of 300 lieutenants. Individual skills are currently taught primarily during phase I of the Basic Officer Course (BOC) and include the rifle range, MCMAP, and land navigation skills among other events. Each of these is resource and time intensive and the current program of instruction for TQ is the same. It calls for 3 days of training to include classes, scenarios, and report writing. This is the standard package, but to fit the training into the TBS schedule it must be modified and broken down into digestible parts.

Training must start with the staff. The first item that must happen is a minimum of four qualified instructors (two from the BOC, one from Infantry Officer's Course (IOC), and one from Combat Instructor (CI) Company) should attend the full 3-

day training course taught by NMITC. This course qualifies

students to become trainers for TBS. This will get TBS to a

minimum number of qualified TQ trainers to begin implementation

of training the rest of the instructor staff. The selected

Marine trainers would also become the primary instructors for

the student companies in TQ.

The next step of implementation is to train instructors in

TQ and the techniques used by instructors to properly integrate

this in training. This can be done as a workshop using the

above-mentioned trainers. Because of the pace of training at

TBS, it will be impossible to get every instructor through

training all at once. Using the video and class provided by

NMITC, the classroom course material can be taught in 4-5 hours.

Adding some limited scenario-based exercises will increase the

instruction to about a day and can then be accomplished in

multiple intervals for instructors already at TBS. Newly

arriving instructors should get the same one day package during

their initial instructor education program (IEP), taught by the

primary instructor. A new instructor designated to become the

primary instructor for TQ would receive the full training course

to become a TQ trainer.

Integration

The next step in implementation is integration into the BOC

period of instruction (POI). The POI has been completely

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revised in the past two years and is now broken down into four phases that encompass individual skills, squad level training, platoon level training, and platoon in a company training. In order to achieve the desired results it is necessary that TQ be implemented throughout all phases. During phase I at the individual level the students should get the three hour class broken down into two periods and can be taught at the 1:300 instructor to student ratio. Next each individual should be required to watch the video prepared by NMITC. This can be done at the platoon level using the classrooms and computer labs. The staff platoon commander (SPC) would be the assistant instructor for this event in order to answer any questions students have during the video. This training will get the students to an appropriate level of understanding of TQ.

Integration into the rest of the POI should be scenario-based instruction that is tied to current field events. The best way to do this is properly scripted scenarios given to combat instructors who would act as aggressors in most training events. Scenarios allow for the greatest number of students to practice the techniques taught in the class in an exercise environment. An example would be during the squad attacks conducted during FEX I, each CI defending an objective would have scripted pieces of information that will give information about the next objective. This approach does multiple things

for the instruction: it allows four to five lieutenants from each squad to exercise TQ skills, it builds realism into the EPW play, and it allows the instructor to debrief the event for the entire squad to bring out the learning objectives. The same technique can be used at any FEX involving aggressors. Currently during the urban patrolling exercise at the FBI academy the final scenario uses a role player, in an empathetic role, to provide needed information to the students. The problem with the scenario is that the students have not been trained in TQ to this point and they often ignore the role player or the information they are trying to pass. Proper TQ training prior to the event would allow the students to value the immediate nature of information and how to best retrieve that information.

The final piece in TQ training for lieutenants occurs at IOC. This training has already begun to be implemented during their final exercise at Twenty-nine Palms. While this training is excellent it would benefit from the infantry students already having been taught the basics of TQ during the BOC. This would let the IOC staff increase the level of training for their students and fully implement elements of TQ throughout the entire course. These new infantry officers will be the primary trainers and executors when they get to the operating forces.

For the Marine Corps to continue to increase the skill sets

of its small unit leaders, it is imperative that training in TQ is implemented at all levels. The starting point for this training should be at The Basic School. Through training of the instructor staff and integration with the existing exercises the impact on the current POI would be minimal and would maximize participation at the individual level. TQ brings a unique ability to the Warfighter at the platoon and squad level in any conflict. The ability to appropriately leverage human intelligence of immediate tactical value can give an immediate edge in information to a leader for decision-making. This edge builds tempo and a bias for action at the lowest levels. That is the goal of maneuver warfare and it is increasingly important in today's environment to enable our small unit leaders all the necessary tools to accomplish the mission. TQ is one of those tools.

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Notes

[1] Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2006), ix.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 247, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf .

[3] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004), 6-1, https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/10536-1/FM/2-0/chap6.htm.

[4] LTCOL Stedman Chandler and COL Robert W. Robb. Front-Line Intelligence. (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 59.

[5] CAPT James P. Milligan. "10TH Moutain (LI) Division ES2 Training: Fusing Language, Cultural Awareness, and TQ for Dominant Battlespace Awareness." Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 32, 1 (2006): 81-20.

[6] DOD, JP 1-02, 533.

[7] Department of the Army, FM 2-0 Intelligence, 6-2.

[8] Ibid, 6-2.

[9] USMC, MCWP 3-33.5, 3-27.

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